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Abstract. We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. Under the sole as-
sumption of correctness—guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes—
we show that every protocol implementing a non-trivial primitive necessarily leaks infor-
mation to a dishonest player. This extends known impossibility results to all non-trivial
primitives. We provide a framework for quantifying this leakage and argue that leakage is a
good measure for the privacy provided to the players by a given protocol. Our framework
also covers the case where the two players are helped by a trusted third party. We show that
despite the help of a trusted third party, the players cannot amplify the cryptographic power
of any primitive. All our results hold even against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries
who honestly follow the protocol but purify their actions and apply a different measurement
at the end of the protocol. As concrete examples, we establish lower bounds on the leakage
of standard universal two-party primitives such as oblivious transfer.
Keywords: two-party primitives, quantum protocols, quantum information theory, oblivious
transfer.
1 Introduction
Quantum communication allows to implement tasks which are classically impossible. The most
prominent example is quantum key distribution [BB84] where two honest players establish a secure
key against an eavesdropper. In the two-party setting however, quantum and classical cryptography
often show similar limits. Oblivious transfer [Lo97], bit commitment [May97,LC97], and even fair
coin tossing [Kit03] are impossible to realize securely both classically and quantumly. On the
other hand, quantum cryptography allows for some weaker primitives impossible in the classical
world. For example, quantum coin-flipping protocols with maximum bias of 1√
2
− 12 exist4 against
any adversary [CK09] while remaining impossible based solely on classical communication. A few
other weak primitives are known to be possible with quantum communication. For example, the
generation of an additive secret-sharing for the product xy of two bits, where Alice holds bit x and
Bob bit y, has been introduced by Popescu and Rohrlich as machines modeling non-signaling non-
locality (also called NL-boxes) [PR94]. If Alice and Bob share an EPR pair, they can simulate an
NL-box with symmetric error probability sin2 π8 [PR94,BLM
+05]. Equivalently, Alice and Bob can
implement 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (1-2-ot) privately provided the receiver Bob gets the bit
of his choice only with probability of error sin2 π8 [Amb05]. It is easy to verify that even with such
⋆ supported by QUSEP (funded by the Danish Natural Science Research Council), Canada’s NSERC, and
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4 In fact, protocols with better bias are known for weak quantum coin flipping [Moc04,Moc05,Moc07].
imperfection these two primitives are impossible to realize in the classical world. This discussion
naturally leads to the following question:
– Which two-party cryptographic primitives are possible to achieve using quantum communica-
tion?
Most standard classical two-party primitives have been shown impossible to implement securely
against weak quantum adversaries reminiscent to the classical honest-but-curious (HBC) behav-
ior [Lo97]. The idea behind these impossibility proofs is to consider parties that purify their actions
throughout the protocol execution. This behavior is indistinguishable from the one specified by
the protocol but guarantees that the joint quantum state held by Alice and Bob at any point
during the protocol remains pure. The possibility for players to behave that way in any two-party
protocol has important consequences. For instance, the impossibility of quantum bit commitment
follows from this fact [May97,LC97]: After the commit phase, Alice and Bob share the pure state
|ψx〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB corresponding to the commitment of bit x. Since a proper commitment scheme
provides no information about x to the receiver Bob, it follows that trA |ψ0〉〈ψ0| = trA |ψ1〉〈ψ1|. In
this case, the Schmidt decomposition guarantees that there exists a unitary U0,1 acting only on
Alice’s side such that |ψ1〉 = (U0,1⊗ IB)|ψ0〉. In other words, if the commitment is concealing then
Alice can open the bit of her choice by applying a suitable unitary transform only to her part.
A similar argument allows to conclude that 1-2-ot is impossible [Lo97]: Suppose Alice is sending
the pair of bits (b0, b1) to Bob through 1-2-ot. Since Alice does not learn Bob’s selection bit, it
follows that Bob can get bit b0 before undoing the reception of b0 and transforming it into the
reception of b1 using a local unitary transform similar to U0,1 for bit commitment. For both these
primitives, privacy for one player implies that local actions by the other player can transform the
honest execution with one input into the honest execution with another input.
In this paper, we investigate the cryptographic power of two-party quantum protocols against
players that purify their actions. This quantum honest-but-curious (QHBC) behavior is the natural
quantum version of classical HBC behavior. We consider the setting where Alice obtains random
variable X and Bob random variable Y according to the joint probability distribution PX,Y . Any
PX,Y models a two-party cryptographic primitive where neither Alice nor Bob provide input. For
the purpose of this paper, this model is general enough since any two-party primitive with inputs
can be randomized (Alice and Bob pick their input at random) so that its behavior can be described
by a suitable joint probability distribution PX,Y . If the randomized version PX,Y is shown to be
impossible to implement securely by any quantum protocol then also the original primitive with
inputs is impossible.
Any quantum protocol implementing PX,Y must produce, when both parties purify their ac-
tions, a joint pure state |ψ〉 ∈ HAA′ ⊗ HBB′ that, when subsystems of A and B are measured in
the computational basis, leads to outcomes X and Y according the distribution PX,Y . Notice that
the registers A′ and B′ only provide the players with extra working space and, as such, do not
contribute to the output of the functionality (so parties are free to measure them the way they
want). In this paper, we adopt a somewhat strict point of view and define a quantum protocol pi
for PX,Y to be correct if and only if the correct outcomes X,Y are obtained and the registers A
′
and B′ do not provide any additional information about Y and X respectively since otherwise pi
would be implementing a different primitive PXX′,Y Y ′ rather than PX,Y .
The state |ψ〉 produced by any correct protocol for PX,Y is called a quantum embedding of
PX,Y . An embedding is called regular if the registers A
′ and B′ are empty. Any embedding |ψ〉 ∈
HAA′⊗HBB′ can be produced in the QHBC model by the trivial protocol asking Alice to generate
|ψ〉 before sending the quantum state in HBB′ to Bob. Therefore, it is sufficient to investigate
the cryptographic power of embeddings in order to understand the power of two-party quantum
cryptography in the QHBC model.
Notice that if X and Y were provided privately to Alice and Bob—through a trusted third party
for instance—then the expected amount of information one party gets about the other party’s
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output is minimal and can be quantified by the Shannon mutual information I(X ;Y ) between X
and Y . Assume that |ψ〉 ∈ HAA′⊗HBB′ is the embedding of PX,Y produced by a correct quantum
protocol. We define the leakage of |ψ〉 as
∆ψ := max {S(X ;BB′)− I(X ;Y ) , S(Y ;AA′)− I(Y ;X) } , (1)
where S(X ;BB′) (resp. S(Y ;AA′)) is the information the quantum registers BB′ (resp. AA′)
provide about the output X (resp. Y ). That is, the leakage is the maximum amount of extra
information about the other party’s output given the quantum state held by one party. It turns
out that S(X ;BB′) = S(Y ;AA′) holds for all embeddings, exhibiting a symmetry similar to
its classical counterpart I(X ;Y ) = I(Y ;X) and therefore, the two quantities we are taking the
maximum of (in the definition of leakage above) coincide.
Contributions. Our first contribution establishes that the notion of leakage is well behaved. We
show that the leakage of any embedding for PX,Y is lower bounded by the leakage of some regular
embedding of the same primitive. Thus, in order to lower bound the leakage of any correct imple-
mentation of a given primitive, it suffices to minimize the leakage over all its regular embeddings.
We also show that the only non-leaking embeddings are the ones for trivial primitives, where a
primitive PX,Y is said to be (cryptographically) trivial if it can be generated by a classical pro-
tocol against HBC adversaries5. It follows that any quantum protocol implementing a non-trivial
primitive PX,Y must leak information under the sole assumption that it produces (X,Y ) with the
right joint distribution. This extends known impossibility results for two-party primitives to all
non-trivial primitives.
Embeddings of primitives arise from protocols where Alice and Bob have full control over the
environment. Having in mind that any embedding of a non-trivial primitive leaks information,
it is natural to investigate what tasks can be implemented without leakage with the help of a
trusted third party. The notion of leakage can easily be adapted to this scenario. We show that no
cryptographic two-party primitive can be implemented without leakage with just one call to the
ideal functionality of a weaker primitive6. This new impossibility result does not follow from the
ones known since they all assume that the state shared between Alice and Bob is pure.
We then turn our attention to the leakage of correct protocols for a few concrete universal
primitives. From the results described above, the leakage of any correct implementation of a prim-
itive can be determined by finding the (regular) embedding that minimizes the leakage. In general,
this is not an easy task since it requires to find the eigenvalues of the reduced density matrix
ρA = trB |ψ〉〈ψ| (or equivalently ρB = trA |ψ〉〈ψ|). As far as we know, no known results allow us
to obtain a non-trivial lower bound on the leakage (which is the difference between the mutual
information and accessible information) of non-trivial primitives. One reason being that in our
setting we need to lower bound this difference with respect to a measurement in one particular
basis. However, when PX,Y is such that the bit-length of either X or Y is short, the leakage
can be computed precisely. We show that any correct implementation of 1-2-ot necessarily leaks
1
2 bit. Since NL-boxes and 1-2-ot are locally equivalent, the same minimal leakage applies to NL-
boxes [WW05b]. This is a stronger impossibility result than the one by Lo [Lo97] since he assumes
perfect/statistical privacy against one party while our approach only assumes correctness (while
both approaches apply even against QHBC adversaries). We finally show that for Rabin-OT and
1-2-ot of r-bit strings (i.e. rotr and 1-2-otr respectively), the leakage approaches 1 exponentially
5 We are aware of the fact that our definition of triviality encompasses cryptographically interest-
ing primitives like coin-tossing and generalizations thereof for which highly non-trivial protocols ex-
ist [Moc07,CK09]. However, the important fact (for the purpose of this paper) is that all these primitives
can be implemented by trivial classical protocols against HBC adversaries.
6 The weakness of a primitive will be formally defined in terms of entropic monotones for classical two-
party computation introduced by Wolf and Wullschleger [WW04], see Section 4.2.
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in r. In other words, correct implementations of these two primitives trivialize as r increases since
the sender gets almost all information about Bob’s reception of the string (in case of rotr) and
Bob’s choice bit (in case of 1-2-otr). These are the first quantitative impossibility results for these
primitives and certainly the first time the hardness of implementing different flavors of string OTs
is shown to increase as the strings to be transmitted get longer.
Finally, we note that our lower bounds on the leakage of the randomized primitives also lower-
bound the minimum leakage for the standard versions of these primitives7 where the players choose
their inputs uniformly at random. While we focus on the typical case where the primitives are run
with uniform inputs, the same reasoning can be applied to primitives with arbitrary distributions
of inputs.
Related Work. Our framework allows to quantify the minimum amount of leakage whereas
standard impossibility proofs as the ones of [LC97,May97,Lo97,AKSW07,BCS09] do not in general
provide such quantification since they usually assume privacy for one player in order to show that
the protocol must be totally insecure for the other player8. By contrast, we derive lower bounds for
the leakage of any correct implementation. At first glance, our approach seems contradictory with
standard impossibility proofs since embeddings leak the same amount towards both parties. To
resolve this apparent paradox it suffices to observe that in previous approaches only the adversary
purified its actions whereas in our case both parties do. If a honest player does not purify his
actions then some leakage may be lost by the act of irreversibly and unnecessarily measuring some
of his quantum registers.
Our results complement the ones obtained by Colbeck in [Col07] for the setting where Alice
and Bob have inputs and obtain identical outcomes (called single-function computations). [Col07]
shows that in any correct implementation of primitives of a certain form, an honest-but-curious
player can access more information about the other party’s input than it is available through the
ideal functionality. Unlike [Col07], we deal in our work with the case where Alice and Bob do not
have inputs but might receive different outputs according to a joint probability distributions. We
show that only trivial distributions can be implemented securely in the QHBC model. Furthermore,
we introduce a quantitative measure of protocol-insecurity that lets us answer which embedding
allow the least effective cheating.
Another notion of privacy in quantum protocols, generalizing its classical counterpart from [CK91,Kus92],
is proposed by Klauck in [Kla04]. Therein, two-party quantum protocols with inputs for comput-
ing a function f : X × Y → Z, where X and Y denote Alice’s and Bob’s respective input spaces,
and privacy against QHBC adversaries are considered. Privacy of a protocol is measured in terms
of privacy loss, defined for each round of the protocol and fixed distribution of inputs PX′,Y ′
by S(B;X |Y ) = H(X |Y ) − S(X |B, Y ), where B denotes Bob’s private working register, and
X : = (X ′, f(X ′, Y ′)), Y : = (Y ′, f(X ′, Y ′)) represent the complete views of Alice and Bob, re-
spectively. Privacy loss of the entire protocol is then defined as the supremum over all joint input
distributions, protocol rounds, and states of working registers. In our framework, privacy loss corre-
sponds to S(X ;Y B)−I(X ;Y ) from Alice point’s of view and S(Y ;XA)−I(X ;Y ) from Bob’s point
of view. Privacy loss is therefore very similar to our definition of leakage except that it requires
the players to get their respective honest outputs. As a consequence, the protocol implementing
PX,Y by asking one party to prepare a regular embedding of PX,Y before sending her register to
the other party would have no privacy loss. Moreover, the scenario analyzed in [Kla04] is restricted
7 The definition of leakage of an embedding can be generalized to protocols with inputs, where it is defined
as max{supVB S(X;VB)−I(X;Y ) , supVA S(VA;Y )−I(X;Y )}, where X and Y involve both inputs and
outputs of Alice and Bob, respectively. The supremum is taken over all possible (quantum) views VA
and VB of Alice and Bob obtained by their (QHBC-consistent) actions (and containing their inputs).
8 Trade-offs between the security for one and the security for the other player have been considered
before, but either the relaxation of security has to be very small [Lo97] or the trade-offs are restricted
to particular primitives such as commitments [SR01,BCH+08].
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to primitives which provide the same output f(X,Y ) to both players. Another difference is that
since privacy loss is computed over all rounds of a protocol, a party is allowed to abort which is
not considered QHBC in our setting. In conclusion, the model of [Kla04] is different from ours even
though the measures of privacy loss and leakage are similar. [Kla04] provides interesting results
concerning trade-offs between privacy loss and communication complexity of quantum protocols,
building upon similar results of [CK91,Kus92] in the classical scenario. It would be interesting to
know whether a similar operational meaning can also be assigned to the new measure of privacy,
introduced in this paper.
A recent result by Ku¨nzler et al. [KMR09] shows that two-party functions that are securely
computable against active quantum adversaries form a strict subset of the set of functions which
are securely computable in the classical HBC model. This complements our result that the sets of
securely computable functions in both HBC and QHBC models are the same.
Roadmap. In Section 2, we introduce the cryptographic and information-theoretic notions and
concepts used throughout the paper. We define, motivate, and analyze the generality of modeling
two-party quantum protocols by embeddings in Section 3 and define triviality of primitives and
embeddings. In Section 4, we define the notion of leakage of embeddings, show basic properties
and argue that it is a reasonable measure of privacy. In Section 5, we explicitly lower bound the
leakage of some universal two-party primitives. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss possible directions
for future research and open questions.
2 Preliminaries
Quantum Information Theory. Let |ψ〉AB ∈ HAB be an arbitrary pure state of the joint
systems A and B. The states of these subsystems are ρA = trB |ψ〉〈ψ| and ρB = trA |ψ〉〈ψ|,
respectively. We denote by S(A) := S(ρA) and S(B) := S(ρB) the von Neumann entropy (de-
fined as the Shannon entropy of the eigenvalues of the density matrix) of subsystem A and B
respectively. Since the joint system is in a pure state, it follows from the Schmidt decomposi-
tion that S(A) = S(B) (see e.g. [NC00]). Analogously to their classical counterparts, we can
define quantum conditional entropy S(A|B) := S(AB) − S(B), and quantum mutual information
S(A;B) := S(A)+S(B)−S(AB) = S(A)−S(A|B). Even though in general, S(A|B) can be nega-
tive, S(A|B) ≥ 0 is always true if A is a classical register. Let R = {(PX(x), ρxR}x∈X be an ensemble
of states ρxR with prior probability PX(x). The average quantum state is ρR =
∑
x∈X PX(x)ρ
x
R.
The famous result by Holevo upper-bounds the amount of classical information about X that can
be obtained by measuring ρR:
Theorem 2.1 (Holevo bound [Hol73,Rus02]). Let Y be the random variable describing the
outcome of some measurement applied to ρR for R = {PX(x), ρxR}x∈X . Then, I(X ;Y ) ≤ S(ρR)−∑
x PX(x)S(ρ
x
R), where equality can be achieved if and only if {ρxR}x∈X are simultaneously diago-
nalizable.
Note that if all states in the ensemble are pure and all different then in order to achieve equality
in the theorem above, they have to form an orthonormal basis of the space they span. In this case,
the variable Y achieving equality is the measurement outcome in this orthonormal basis.
Dependent Part. The following definition introduces a random variable describing the correla-
tion between two random variables X and Y , obtained by collapsing all values x1 and x2 for which
Y has the same conditional distribution, to a single value.
Definition 2.2 (Dependent part [WW04]). For two random variables X,Y , let fX(x) : =
PY |X=x. Then the dependent part of X with respect to Y is defined as X ց Y := fX(X).
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The dependent part X ց Y is the minimum random variable among the random variables com-
putable from X for which X ↔ X ց Y ↔ Y forms a Markov chain [WW04]. In other words,
for any random variable K = f(X) such that X ↔ K ↔ Y is a Markov chain, there ex-
ists a function g such that g(K) = X ց Y . Immediately from the definition we get several
other properties of X ց Y [WW04]: H(Y |X ց Y ) = H(Y |X), I(X ;Y ) = I(X ց Y ;Y ), and
X ց Y = X ց (Y ց X). The second and the third formula yield I(X ;Y ) = I(X ց Y ;Y ց X).
The notion of dependent part has been further investigated in [FWW04,IMNW04,WW05a].
Wullschleger and Wolf have shown that quantities H(X ց Y |Y ) and H(Y ց X |X) are monotones
for two-party computation [WW05a]. That is, none of these values can increase during classical
two-party protocols. In particular, if Alice and Bob start a protocol from scratch then classical
two-party protocols can only produce (X,Y ) such that: H(X ց Y |Y ) = H(Y ց X |X) = 0, since
H(X ց Y |Y ) > 0 if and only if H(Y ց X |X) > 0 [WW05a]. Conversely, any primitive satisfying
H(X ց Y |Y ) = H(Y ց X |X) = 0 can be implemented securely in the honest-but-curious (HBC)
model. We call such primitives trivial9.
Purification. All security questions we ask are with respect to (quantum) honest-but-curious
adversaries. In the classical honest-but-curious adversary model (HBC), the parties follow the
instructions of a protocol but store all information available to them. Quantum honest-but-curious
adversaries (QHBC), on the other hand, are allowed to behave in an arbitrary way that cannot be
distinguished from their honest behavior by the other player.
Almost all impossibility results in quantum cryptography rely upon a quantum honest-but-
curious behavior of the adversary. This behavior consists in purifying all actions of the honest
players. Purifying means that instead of invoking classical randomness from a random tape, for
instance, the adversary relies upon quantum registers holding all random bits needed. The opera-
tions to be executed from the random outcome are then performed quantumly without fixing the
random outcomes. For example, suppose a protocol instructs a party to pick with probability p
state |φ0〉C and with probability 1− p state |φ1〉C before sending it to the other party through the
quantum channel C. The purified version of this instruction looks as follows: Prepare a quantum
register in state
√
p|0〉R +
√
1− p|1〉R holding the random process. Add a new register initially in
state |0〉C before applying the unitary transform U : |r〉R|0〉C 7→ |r〉R|φr〉C for r ∈ {0, 1}, send
register C through the quantum channel and keep register R.
From the receiver’s point of view, the purified behavior is indistinguishable from the one re-
lying upon a classical source of randomness because in both cases, the state of register C is
ρ = p|φ0〉〈φ0|+ (1 − p)|φ1〉〈φ1|. All operations invoking classical randomness can be purified simi-
larly [LC97,May97,Lo97,Ken04]. The result is that measurements are postponed as much as pos-
sible and only extract information required to run the protocol in the sense that only when both
players need to know a random outcome, the corresponding quantum register holding the random
coin will be measured. If both players purify their actions then the joint state at any point during
the execution will remain pure, until the very last step of the protocol when the outcomes are
measured.
Secure Two-Party Computation. In Section 5, we investigate the leakage of several universal
cryptographic two-party primitives. By universality we mean that any two-party secure function
evaluation can be reduced to them. We investigate the completely randomized versions where
players do not have inputs but receive randomized outputs instead. Throughout this paper, the
term primitive usually refers to the joint probability distribution defining its randomized version.
Any protocol implementing the standard version of a primitive (with inputs) can also be used to
implement a randomized version of the same primitive, with the “inputs” chosen according to an
arbitrary fixed probability distribution.
9 See Footnote 5 for a caveat about this terminology.
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3 Two-Party Protocols and Their Embeddings
3.1 Correctness
In this work, we consider cryptographic primitives providing X to honest player Alice and Y to
honest player Bob according to a joint probability distribution PX,Y . The goal of this section is to
define when a protocol pi correctly implements the primitive PX,Y . The first natural requirement
is that once the actions of pi are purified by both players, measurements of registers A and B in
the computational basis10 provide joint outcome (X,Y ) = (x, y) with probability PX,Y (x, y).
Protocol pi can use extra registers A′ on Alice’s and B′ on Bob’s side providing them with
(quantum) working space. The purification of all actions of pi therefore generates a pure state
|ψ〉 ∈ HAB ⊗HA′B′ . A second requirement for the correctness of the protocol pi is that these extra
registers are only used as working space, i.e. the final state |ψ〉ABA′B′ is such that the content
of Alice’s working register A′ does not give her any further information about Bob’s output Y
than what she can infer from her honest output X and vice versa for B′. Formally, we require
that S(XA′;Y ) = I(X ;Y ) and S(X ;Y B′) = I(X ;Y ) or equivalently, that A′ ↔ X ↔ Y and
X ↔ Y ↔ B′ form Markov chains11.
Definition 3.1. A protocol pi for PX,Y is correct if measuring registers A and B of its final state
in the computational basis yields outcomes X and Y with distribution PX,Y and the final state
satisfies S(X ;Y B′) = S(XA′;Y ) = I(X ;Y ) where A′ and B′ denote the extra working registers of
Alice and Bob. The state |ψ〉 ∈ HAB ⊗HA′B′ is called an embedding of PX,Y if it can be produced
by the purification of a correct protocol for PX,Y .
We would like to point out that our definition of correctness is stronger than the usual classical
notion which only requires the correct distribution of the output of the honest players. For example,
the trivial classical protocol for the primitive PX,Y in which Alice samples both player’s outputs
XY , sends Y to Bob, but keeps a copy of Y for herself, is not correct according to our definition,
because it implements a fundamentally different primitive, namely PXY,Y .
3.2 Regular Embeddings
We call an embedding |ψ〉ABA′B′ regular if the working registers A′, B′ are empty. Formally, let
Θn,m := {θ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → [0 . . . 2pi)} be the set of functions mapping bit-strings of length
m+ n to real numbers between 0 and 2pi.
Definition 3.2. For a joint probability distribution PX,Y where X ∈ {0, 1}n and Y ∈ {0, 1}m, we
define the set
E(PX,Y ) :=

|ψ〉 ∈ HAB : |ψ〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n, y∈{0,1}m
eiθ(x,y)
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB , θ ∈ Θn,m

 ,
and call any state |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) a regular embedding of the joint probability distribution PX,Y .
10 It is clear that every quantum protocol for which the final measurement (providing (x, y) with distribu-
tion PX,Y to the players) is not in the computational basis can be transformed into a protocol of the
described form by two additional local unitary transformations.
11 Markov chains with quantum ends have been defined in [DFSS07] and used in subsequent works such
as [FS09]. It is straightforward to verify that the entropic condition S(XA′;Y ) = I(X;Y ) is equivalent
to A′ ↔ X ↔ Y being a Markov chain and similarly for the other condition.
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Clearly, any |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) produces (X,Y ) with distribution PX,Y since the probability that
Alice measures x and Bob measures y in the computational basis is |〈ψ|x, y〉|2 = PX,Y (x, y). In
order to specify a particular regular embedding one only needs to give the description of the
phase function θ(x, y). We denote by |ψθ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) the quantum embedding of PX,Y with phase
function θ. The constant function θ(x, y) := 0 for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, y ∈ {0, 1}m corresponds to what
we call canonical embedding |ψ0〉 :=
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB .
In Lemma 4.3 below we show that every primitive PX,Y has a regular embedding which is in
some sense the most secure among all embeddings of PX,Y .
3.3 Trivial Classical Primitives and Trivial Embeddings
In this section, we define triviality of classical primitives and (bipartite) embeddings. We show
that for any non-trivial classical primitive, its canonical quantum embedding is also non-trivial.
Intuitively, a primitive PX,Y is trivial if X and Y can be generated by Alice and Bob from scratch
in the classical honest-but-curious (HBC) model12. Formally, we define triviality via an entropic
quantity based on the notion of dependent part (see Section 2).
Definition 3.3. A primitive PX,Y is called trivial if it satisfies H(X ց Y |Y ) = 0, or equivalently,
H(Y ց X |X) = 0. Otherwise, the primitive is called non-trivial.
Definition 3.4. A regular embedding |ψ〉AB ∈ E(PX,Y ) is called trivial if either S(X ց Y |B) = 0
or S(Y ց X |A) = 0. Otherwise, we say that |ψ〉AB is non-trivial.
Notice that unlike in the classical case, S(X ց Y |B) = 0⇔ S(Y ց X |A) = 0 does not hold in gen-
eral. As an example, consider a shared quantum state where the computational basis corresponds
to the Schmidt basis for only one of its subsystems, say for A. Let |ψ〉 = α|0〉A|ξ0〉B + β|1〉A|ξ1〉B
be such that both subsystems are two-dimensional, {|ξ0〉, |ξ1〉} 6= {|0〉, |1〉}, 〈ξ0|ξ1〉 = 0, and
|〈ξ0|0〉| 6= |〈ξ1|0〉|. We then have S(X |B) = 0 and S(Y |A) > 0 while X = X ց Y and Y = Y ց X .
To illustrate this definition of triviality, we argue in the following that if a primitive PX,Y
has a trivial regular embedding, there exists a classical protocol which generates X,Y securely
in the HBC model. Let |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) be trivial and assume without loss of generality that
S(Y ց X |A) = 0. Intuitively, this means that Alice can learn everything possible about Bob’s
outcome Y (Y could include some private coin-flips on Bob’s side, but that is “filtered out” by the
dependent part). More precisely, Alice holding register A can measure her part of the shared state
to completely learn a realization of Y ց X , specifying PX|Y=y. She then chooses X according to
the distribution PX|Y=y. An equivalent way of trivially generating (X,Y ) classically is the following
classical protocol:
1. Alice samples PX|Y=y′ from distribution PYցX and announces its outcome to Bob. She samples
x from the distribution PX|Y=y′ .
2. Bob picks y with probability PY |YցX=PX|Y =y′ .
Of course, the same reasoning applies in case S(X ց Y |B) = 0 with the roles of Alice and Bob
reversed.
In fact, the following lemma (proven in Appendix B) shows that any non-trivial primitive PX,Y
has a non-trivial embedding, i.e. there exists a quantum protocol correctly implementing PX,Y
while leaking less information to QHBC adversaries than any classical protocol for PX,Y in the
HBC model.
Lemma 3.5. If PX,Y is a non-trivial primitive then the canonical embedding |ψ0〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) is
also non-trivial.
12 See Footnote 5 for a caveat about this terminology.
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4 The Leakage of Quantum Embeddings
We formally define the leakage of embeddings and establish properties of the leakage. The proofs
of all statements in this section can be found in Appendix C.
4.1 Definition and Basic Properties of Leakage
A perfect implementation of PX,Y simply provides X to Alice and Y to Bob and does nothing
else. The expected amount of information that one random variable gives about the other is
I(X ;Y ) = H(X) −H(X |Y ) = H(Y ) −H(Y |X) = I(Y ;X). Intuitively, we define the leakage of
a quantum embedding |ψ〉ABA′B′ of PX,Y as the larger of the two following quantities: the extra
amount of information Bob’s quantum registers BB′ provide aboutX and the extra amount Alice’s
quantum state in AA′ provides about Y respectively in comparison to “the minimum amount”
I(X ;Y ).13
Definition 4.1. Let |ψ〉 ∈ HABA′B′ be an embedding of PX,Y . We define the leakage |ψ〉 as
∆ψ(PX,Y ) := max {S(X ;BB′)− I(X ;Y ) , S(AA′;Y )− I(X ;Y )} .
Furthermore, we say that |ψ〉 is δ-leaking if ∆ψ(PX,Y ) ≥ δ .
It is easy to see that the leakage is non-negative since S(X ;BB′) ≥ S(X ; B˜) for B˜ the result of
a quantum operation applied to BB′. Such an operation could be the trace over the extra working
register B′ and a measurement in the computational basis of each qubit of the part encoding Y ,
yielding S(X ; B˜) = I(X ;Y ).
We want to argue that our notion of leakage is a good measure for the privacy of the player’s
outputs. In the same spirit, we will argue that the minimum achievable leakage for a primitive
is related to the “hardness” of implementing it. We start off by proving several basic properties
about leakage.
For a general state inHABA′B′ the quantities S(X ;BB′)−I(X ;Y ) and S(AA′;Y )−I(X ;Y ) are
not necessarily equal. Note though that they coincide for regular embeddings |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) pro-
duced by a correct protocol (where the work spaces A′ and B′ are empty): Notice that S(X ;B) =
S(X) + S(B)− S(X,B) = H(X) + S(B)−H(X) = S(B) and because |ψ〉 is pure, S(A) = S(B).
Therefore, S(X ;B) = S(A;Y ) and the two quantities coincide. The following lemma states that
this actually happens for all embeddings and hence, the definition of leakage is symmetric with
respect to both players.
Lemma 4.2 (Symmetry). Let |ψ〉 ∈ HABA′B′ be an embedding of PX,Y . Then,
∆ψ(PX,Y ) = S(X ;BB
′)− I(X ;Y ) = S(AA′;Y )− I(X ;Y ) .
The next lemma shows that the leakage of an embedding of a given primitive is lower-bounded
by the leakage of some regular embedding of the same primitive, which simplifies the calculation
of lower bounds for the leakage of embeddings.
Lemma 4.3. For every embedding |ψ〉 of a primitive PX,Y , there is a regular embedding |ψ′〉 of
PX,Y such that ∆ψ(PX,Y ) ≥ ∆ψ′(PX,Y ).
13 There are other natural candidates for the notion of leakage such as the difference in difficulty between
guessing Alice’s output X by measuring Bob’s final quantum state B and based on the output of the
ideal functionality Y . While such definitions do make sense, they turn out not to be as easy to work
with and it is an open question whether the natural properties described later in this section can be
established for these notions of leakage as well.
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So far, we have defined the leakage of an embedding of a primitive. The natural definition of
the leakage of a primitive is the following.
Definition 4.4. We define the leakage of a primitive PX,Y as the minimal leakage among all
protocols correctly implementing PX,Y . Formally,
∆PX,Y := min|ψ〉
∆ψ(PX,Y ) ,
where the minimization is over all embeddings |ψ〉 of PX,Y .
Notice that the minimum in the previous definition is well-defined, because by Lemma 4.3, it is suf-
ficient to minimize over regular embeddings |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ). Furthermore, the function ∆ψ(PX,Y )
is continuous on the compact (i.e. closed and bounded) set [0, 2pi]|X×Y| of complex phases corre-
sponding to elements |x, y〉AB in the formula for |ψ〉AB ∈ E(PX,Y ) and therefore it achieves its
minimum.
The following theorem shows that the leakage of any embedding of a primitive PX,Y is lower-
bounded by the minimal leakage achievable for primitive PXցY,YցX (which due to Lemma 4.3 is
achieved by a regular embedding).
Theorem 4.5. For any primitive PX,Y , ∆PX,Y ≥ ∆PXցY,YցX .
Proof (Sketch). The proof idea is to pre-process the registers storing X and Y in a way allowing
Alice and Bob to convert a regular embedding of PX,Y (for which the minimum leakage is achieved)
into a regular embedding of PXցY,YցX by measuring parts of these registers. It follows that on
average, the leakage of the resulting regular embedding of PXցY,YցX is at most the leakage of
the embedding of PX,Y the players started with. Hence, there must be a regular embedding of
PXցY,YցX leaking at most as much as the best embedding of PX,Y . See Appendix C.3 for the
complete proof. ⊓⊔
4.2 Leakage as Measure of Privacy and Hardness of Implementation
The main results of this section are consequences of the Holevo bound (Theorem 2.1).
Theorem 4.6. If a two-party quantum protocol provides the correct outcomes of PX,Y to the
players without leaking extra information, then PX,Y must be a trivial primitive.
Proof. Theorem 4.5 implies that if there is a 0–leaking embedding of PX,Y than there is also
a 0–leaking embedding of PXցY,YցX . Let us therefore assume that |ψ〉 is a non-leaking em-
bedding of PX,Y such that X = X ց Y and Y = Y ց X . We can write |ψ〉 in the form
|ψ〉 = ∑x√PX(x)|x〉|ϕx〉 and get ρB = ∑x PX(x)|ϕx〉〈ϕx|. For the leakage of |ψ〉 we have:
∆ψ(PX,Y ) = S(X ;B) − I(X ;Y ) = S(ρB) − I(X ;Y ) = 0. From the Holevo bound (Theorem 2.1)
follows that the states {|ϕx〉}x form an orthonormal basis of their span (since X = X ց Y , they
are all different) and that Y captures the result of a measurement in this basis, which therefore is
the computational basis. Since Y = Y ց X , we get that for each x, there is a single yx ∈ Y such
that |ϕx〉 = |yx〉. The primitives PXցY,YցX and PX,Y are therefore trivial. ⊓⊔
In other words, the only primitives that two-party quantum protocols can implement correctly
(without the help of a trusted third party) and without leakage are the trivial ones! We note
that it is not necessary to use the strict notion of correctness from Definition 3.1 in this theorem,
but a more complicated proof can be done solely based on the correct distribution of the values.
This result can be seen as a quantum extension of the corresponding characterization for the
cryptographic power of classical protocols in the HBC model. Whereas classical two-party protocols
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cannot achieve anything non-trivial, their quantum counterparts necessarily leak information when
they implement non-trivial primitives.
The notion of leakage can be extended to protocols involving a trusted third party (see Ap-
pendix C.6). A special case of such protocols are the ones where the players are allowed one call
to a black box for a certain non-trivial primitive. It is natural to ask which primitives can be
implemented without leakage in this case. As it turns out, the monotones H(X ց Y |Y ) and
H(Y ց X |X), introduced in [WW04], are also monotones for quantum computation, in the
sense that all joint random variables X ′, Y ′ that can be generated by quantum players with-
out leakage using one black-box call to PX,Y satisfy H(X
′ ց Y ′|Y ′) ≤ H(X ց Y |Y ) and
H(Y ′ ց X ′|X ′) ≤ H(Y ց X |X).
Theorem 4.7. Suppose that primitives PX,Y and PX′,Y ′ satisfy H(X
′ ց Y ′|Y ′) > H(X ց Y |Y )
or H(Y ′ ց X ′|X ′) > H(Y ց X |X). Then any implementation of PX′,Y ′ using just one call to
the ideal functionality for PX,Y leaks information.
4.3 Reducibility of Primitives and Their Leakage
This section is concerned with the following question: Given two primitives PX,Y and PX′,Y ′ such
that PX,Y is reducible to PX′,Y ′ , what is the relationship between the leakage of PX,Y and the
leakage of PX′,Y ′? We use the notion of reducibility in the following sense: We say that a primitive
PX,Y is reducible in the HBC model to a primitive PX′,Y ′ if PX,Y can be securely implemented in
the HBC model from (one call to) a secure implementation of PX′,Y ′ . The above question can also
be generalized to the case where PX,Y can be computed from PX′,Y ′ only with certain probability.
Notice that the answer, even if we assume perfect reducibility, is not captured in our previous
result from Lemma 4.3, since an embedding of PX′,Y ′ is not necessarily an embedding of PX,Y (it
might violate the correctness condition). However, under certain circumstances, we can show that
∆PX′,Y ′ ≥ ∆PX,Y .
Theorem 4.8. Assume that primitives PX,Y and PX′,Y ′ = PX′0X′1,Y ′0Y ′1 satisfy the condition:∑
x,y:PX′0,Y
′
0 |X
′
1=x,Y
′
1=y
≃PX,Y
PX′1,Y ′1 (x, y) ≥ 1− δ,
where the relation ≃ means that the two distributions are equal up to relabeling of the alphabet.
Then, ∆PX′,Y ′ ≥ (1 − δ)∆PX,Y .
This theorem allows us to derive a lower bound on the leakage of 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer of
r-bit strings in Section 5.
5 The Leakage of Universal Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we exhibit lower bounds on the leakage of some universal two-party primitives, see
Appendix A for an overview of these primitives. In the following table, rotr denotes the r-bit string
version of randomized Rabin OT, where Alice receives a random r-bit string and Bob receives the
same string or an erasure symbol, each with probability 1/2. Similarly, 1-2-otr denotes the string
version of 1-2-ot, where Alice receives two r-bit strings and Bob receives one of them. By 1-2-otp
we denote the noisy version of 1-2-ot, where the 1-2-ot functionality is implemented correctly
only with probability 1−p. Table 1 summarizes the lower bounds on the leakage of these primitives
(the derivations can be found in Appendix D). We note that Wolf and Wullschleger [WW05b] have
shown that a randomized 1-2-ot can be transformed by local operations into an additive sharing
of an AND (here called sand). Therefore, our results for 1-2-ot below also apply to sand.
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primitive leaking at least comments
rot1 (h( 1
4
)− 1
2
) ≈ 0.311 same leakage for all regular embeddings
rotr (1−O(r2−r)) same leakage for all regular embeddings
1-2-ot, sand 1
2
minimized by canonical embedding
1-2-otr (1−O(r2−r)) (suboptimal) lower bound
1-2-otp
“
1/2−p−
√
p(1−p)
”2
8 ln 2
if p < sin2(pi/8) ≈ 0.15, (suboptimal) lower bound
Table 1. Lower bounds on the leakage for universal two-party primitives
1-2-otr and 1-2-otp are primitives where the direct evaluation of the leakage for a general
embedding |ψθ〉 is hard, because the number of possible phases increases exponentially in the
number of qubits. Instead of computing S(A) directly, we derive (suboptimal) lower bounds on the
leakage.
Based on the examples of rotr and 1-2-ot, it is tempting to conjecture that the leakage is
always minimized for the canonical embedding, which agrees with the geometric intuition that the
minimal pairwise distinguishability of quantum states in a mixture minimizes the von Neumann
entropy of the mixture. However, Jozsa and Schlienz have shown that this intuition is sometimes
incorrect [JS00]. In a quantum system of dimension at least three, we can have the following
situation: For two sets of pure states {|ui〉}ni=1 and {|vi〉}ni=1 satisfying |〈ui|uj〉| ≤ |〈vi|vj〉| for all
i, j, there exist probabilities pi such that for ρu :=
∑n
i=1 pi|ui〉〈ui|, ρv :=
∑n
i=1 pi|vi〉〈vi|, it holds
that S(ρu) < S(ρv). As we can see, although each pair |ui〉, |uj〉 is more distinguishable than the
corresponding pair |vi〉, |vj〉, the overall ρu provides us with less uncertainty than ρv. It follows that
although for the canonical embedding |ψ0〉 =
∑
y |ϕy〉|y〉 of PX,Y the mutual overlaps |〈ϕy |ϕy′〉| are
clearly maximized, it does not necessarily imply that S(A) in this case is minimal over E(PX,Y ). It
is an interesting open question to find a primitive whose canonical embedding does not minimize
the leakage or to prove that no such primitive exists.
For the primitive P
otp
X,Y , our lower bound on the leakage only holds for p < sin
2(pi/8) ≈ 0.15.
Notice that in reality, the leakage is strictly positive for any embedding of P
otp
X,Y with p < 1/4,
since for p < 1/4, P
otp
X,Y is a non-trivial primitive. On the other hand, P
ot1/4
X,Y is a trivial primitive
implemented securely by the following protocol in the classical HBC model:
1. Alice chooses randomly between her input bits x0 and x1 and sends the chosen value xa to
Bob.
2. Bob chooses his selection bit c uniformly at random and sets y := xa.
Equality xc = y is satisfied if either a = c, which happens with probability 1/2, or if a 6= c and
xa = x1−a, which happens with probability 1/4. Since the two events are disjoint, it follows that
xc = y with probability 3/4 and that the protocol implements P
ot1/4
X,Y . The implementation is clearly
secure against honest-but-curious Alice, since she does not receive any message from Bob. It is also
secure against Bob, since he receives only one bit from Alice. By letting Alice randomize the value
of the bit she is sending, the players can implement P
otp
X,Y securely for any value 1/4 < p ≤ 1/2.
6 Conclusion and Open Problems
We have provided a quantitative extension of qualitative impossibility results for two-party quan-
tum cryptography. All non-trivial primitives leak information when implemented by quantum
protocols. Notice that demanding a protocol to be non-leaking does in general not imply the pri-
vacy of the players’ outputs. For instance, consider a protocol implementing 1-2-ot but allowing a
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curious receiver with probability 12 to learn both bits simultaneously or with probability
1
2 to learn
nothing about them. Such a protocol for 1-2-ot would be non-leaking but nevertheless insecure.
Consequently, Theorem 4.6 not only tells us that any quantum protocol implementing a non-trivial
primitive must be insecure, but also that a privacy breach will reveal itself as leakage. Our frame-
work allows to quantify the leakage of any two-party quantum protocol correctly implementing a
primitive. The impossibility results obtained here are stronger than standard ones since they only
rely on the cryptographic correctness of the protocol. Furthermore, we present lower bounds on
the leakage of some universal two-party primitives.
A natural open question is to find a way to identify good embeddings for a given primitive.
In particular, how far can the leakage of the canonical embedding be from the best one? Such a
characterization, even if only applicable to special primitives, would allow to lower bound their
leakage and would also help to understand the power of two-party quantum cryptography in a
more concise way.
It would also be interesting to find a measure of cryptographic non-triviality for two-party
primitives and to see how it relates to the minimum leakage of any implementation by quantum
protocols. For instance, is it true that quantum protocols for primitive PX,Y leak more if the
minimum (total variation) distance between PX,Y and any trivial primitive increases?
Another question we leave for future research is to define and investigate other notions of leak-
age, e.g. in the one-shot setting instead of in the asymptotic regime (as outlined in Footnote 13).
Results in the one-shot setting have already been established for data compression [RW05], chan-
nel capacities [RWW06], state-merging [WR07,Ber08] and other (quantum-) information-theoretic
tasks.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to find more applications for the concept of leakage,
considered also for protocols using an environment as a trusted third party. In this direction, we
have shown in Theorem 4.7 that any two-party quantum protocol for a given primitive, using a black
box for an “easier” primitive, leaks information. Lower-bounding this leakage is an interesting open
question. We might also ask how many copies of the “easier” primitive are needed to implement
the “harder” primitive by a quantum protocol, which would give us an alternative measure of
non-triviality of two-party primitives.
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A Cryptographic Primitives
Here we list the standard cryptographic primitives studied in this paper.
String Rabin OT (rotr): [Rab81] Alice sends a random string of r bits to Bob who receives
it with probability 1/2, otherwise he receives a special symbol ⊥. Alice does not learn any
information about whether Bob has received the string she sent.
One-out-of-two String OT (1-2-otr): [Wie83,EGL82] Alice sends two random r-bit strings
to Bob who decides which of them he receives. Bob does not learn any information about the
other one of Alice’s strings and Alice does not learn which of the strings has been received by
Bob.
Additive sharing of AND (sand): [PR94] Alice and Bob choose their respective input bits x
and y, and receive the output bits a resp. b such that a⊕ b = x∧ y and Pr[a = 0] = 1/2. They
do not get any other information.
Noisy one-out-of-two OT (1-2-otp): Alice sends two bits to Bob who decides which of them
he wants to receive. The selected bit is transmitted to him over a noisy channel with noise rate
p. Bob does not learn any information about the other one of Alice’s bits and Alice does not
learn any information about Bob’s selection bit.
We present a description of the randomized versions of the primitives in the following:
String Rabin OT (rotr): For x ∈ {0, 1}r and y ∈ {0, 1}r ∪ {⊥}:
P rot
r
X,Y (x, y) =
{
2−r−1 if x = y or y = ⊥,
0 otherwise,
is the joint probability distribution associated to an execution of Rabin OT of a random binary
string of length r.
One-out-of-two OT (1-2-ot): For x0, x1, y, c ∈ {0, 1}:
P otX,Y ((x0, x1), (c, y)) =
{
1
8 if y = xc,
0 otherwise,
is the joint probability distribution for the execution of one-out-of-two OT upon random input
bits.
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One-out-of-two String OT (1-2-otr): For x0, x1, y ∈ {0, 1}r and c ∈ {0, 1}, let
P ot
r
X,Y ((x0, x1), (c, y)) =
{
2−2r−1 if y = xc,
0 otherwise,
is the joint probability distribution associated to an execution of one-out-of-two r-bit string
OT upon random inputs.
Additive Sharing of AND (sand): For x, y, a, b ∈ {0, 1}:
P nlX,Y ((x, a), (y, b)) =
{
1
8 if xy = a⊕ b,
0 otherwise,
is the joint probability distribution associated to the generation of an additive sharing for the
and of two random bits.
Noisy one-out-of-two OT (1-2-otp): For x0, x1, y, c ∈ {0, 1} and p ∈ (0, 1/2):
P
otp
X,Y ((x0, x1), (c, y)) =
{
1−p
8 if y = xc,
p
8 otherwise,
is the joint probability distribution associated to an execution of one-out-of-two OT where the
selected bit is received through a binary symmetric channel with error rate p.
B Proof of Lemma 3.5
A non-trivial embedding of PX,Y can be created from a non-trivial embedding of PXցY,YցX by
applying local unitary transforms. We therefore assume without loss of generality that X = X ց Y
and Y = Y ց X . Let
|ψ0〉 :=
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉
be the canonical embedding of PX,Y . Since X = X ց Y and Y = Y ց X , it holds for any x0 6= x1
that PY |X=x0 6= PY |X=x1. Furthermore, since PX,Y is non-trivial, there exist x0 6= x1 and y0 such
that PY |X=x0(y0) > 0 and PY |X=x1(y0) > 0. The state |ψ0〉 can be written in the form:
|ψ0〉 =
√
PX(x0)|x0〉
∑
y
√
PY |X=x0(y)|y〉+
√
PX(x1)|x1〉
∑
y
√
PY |X=x1(y)|y〉+ |ψ′〉,
where tr(|x0〉〈x0| trB |ψ′〉〈ψ′|) = tr(|x1〉〈x1| trB |ψ′〉〈ψ′|) = 0. Set |ϕxb〉 :=
∑
y
√
PY |X=xb(y)|y〉 for
b ∈ {0, 1}. Since PY |X=x0 6= PY |X=x1 , we get that |〈ϕx0 |ϕx1〉| < 1. Because all coefficients at |y〉
in the normalized vectors |ϕx0〉 and |ϕx1〉 are non-negative, and the coefficients at |y0〉 are both
positive, 〈ϕx0 |ϕx1〉 6= 0. Therefore, the non-identical states |ϕx0〉 and |ϕx1〉 cannot be perfectly
distinguished, which implies that Bob cannot learn whether X = x0 or X = x1 with probability
1. Therefore, the von Neumann entropy on Bob’s side S(B) is such that S(B) < H(X). As
H(X ց Y |Y ) > 0 implies H(Y ց X |X) > 0, we can argue in the same way that S(A) < H(Y )
from which follows that |ψ0〉 is a non-trivial quantum embedding of PX,Y . ⊓⊔
C Proofs of Properties of Leakage
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2
We have already shown that the statement is true in the case where both A′ and B′ are trivial.
In the case where A′ is trivial and B′ is not, the Markov chain condition implies that |ψ〉 is of the
form
|ψ〉 =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB|ϕy〉B′ ,
16
hence, Bob can fix y0 and apply a unitary transform UBB′ on his part of the system, such that
UBB′ |y, ϕy〉 = |y, ϕy0〉, and
IA ⊗ UBB′ |ψ〉ABB′ = |ψ∗〉AB ⊗ |ϕy0〉B′ ,
where |ψ∗〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ). In the resulting product state, S(X ;BB′)−I(X ;Y ) = S(X ;B)−I(X ;Y ) =
S(A;Y )− I(X ;Y ), due to the fact that |ψ∗〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ). An analogous statement holds in the case
where B′ is trivial and A′ is non-trivial.
We now assume that both A′ and B′ are non-trivial. An embedding of PX,Y can be written as
|ψ〉 =∑x,y√PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB|ϕx,y〉A′B′ .
For every x and y, we can write the pure state
|ϕx,y〉A′B′ =
K∑
k=1
√
λx,yk |ex,yk 〉A′ |fx,yk 〉B′
in Schmidt form. For the reduced density matrices, we obtain
ρx,yA′ =
∑
k
λx,yk |ex,yk 〉〈ex,yk | .
Since any embedding |ψ〉 ∈ HABA′B′ of PX,Y is produced by a correct protocol, it satisfies
S(XA′;B) = S(X ;Y B′) = I(X ;Y )
which is equivalent to A′ ↔ X ↔ Y and X ↔ Y ↔ B′ being Markov chains. It follows that
for every x and y 6= y′, the reduced density matrices ρx,yA′ = ρx,y
′
A′ = ρ
x
A′ coincide and therefore,
the eigenvalues λx,yk cannot depend on y. Because of X ↔ Y ↔ B′, they can neither depend on
x. Hence, |ϕx,y〉 = ∑k√λkeiθ′(k,x,y)|exk〉|fyk 〉. The phase factors arise from the fact that from a
reduced density matrix the global phases of the Schmidt-basis elements cannot be determined.
Let us fix a set of orthogonal states {|k〉}k. We define the unitary UAA′ to be the mapping of
the orthonormal states {|exk〉}k into the orthonormal states {|k〉}k. Note that UAA′ only acts on
register A′ conditioned on the x-value in A. Analogously, let UBB′ map the states {|fyk 〉}k into
{|k〉}k. Applying UAA′ ⊗ UBB′ to |ψ〉 results into state∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB
∑
k
√
λke
iθ′(k,x,y)|k, k〉A′B′
=
∑
k
√
λk
(∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)e
iθ′(k,x,y)|x, y〉
)
|k, k〉
=
∑
k
√
λk|ψk〉AB ⊗ |k, k〉A′B′ ,
where each |ψk〉AB ∈ E(PX,Y ). The cqq-state ρXBB′ can now be written in the form:
ρXBB′ =
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗
∑
k
λk|φxk, k〉〈φxk, k| ,
where |φxk〉 =
∑
y
√
PY |X=xeiθ
′(k,x,y)|y〉. Due to the second component, the states |φxk , k〉 are mu-
tually orthogonal for each x. Therefore, for each x,
S
(∑
k
λk|φxk, k〉〈φxk , k|
)
= H(λ1, . . . , λK) .
As a result we get that
S(XBB′) = H(X) +
∑
x
PX(x)H(λ1, . . . , λK) = H(X) +H(λ1, . . . , λK)
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and analogously,
S(AA′Y ) = H(Y ) +H(λ1, . . . , λK) ,
yielding the desired statement as follows:
S(X ;BB′)− I(X ;Y ) = H(X) + S(BB′)− S(XBB′)− I(X ;Y )
= H(X) + S(BB′)− (H(X) +H(λ1, . . . , λK)) − I(X ;Y )
= H(Y ) + S(AA′)− (H(Y ) +H(λ1, . . . , λK))− I(X ;Y )
= S(AA′;Y )− I(X ;Y ).
The equality S(AA′) = S(BB′) follows from the purity of |ψ〉. ⊓⊔
C.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3
In the case where A′ and B′ are both trivial, then |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) is a regular embedding and
the statement holds trivially. In the case where A′ is trivial and B′ is not, we have shown in the
proof of Lemma 4.2 that an embedding |ψ〉 of PX,Y is locally equivalent to a state |ψ∗〉 ⊗ |σ〉 for
|ψ∗〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) and a pure state |σ〉. An analogous statement holds if B′ is trivial and A′ is not.
Therefore, in these two cases we get for some |ψ∗〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) that ∆ψ = ∆ψ∗ .
Now assume that both A′ and B′ are non-trivial. Embedding |ψ〉 of PX,Y can be written as
|ψ〉 =∑x,y√PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB|ϕx,y〉A′B′ .
In the proof of Lemma 4.2 we show the existence of two local unitary transforms UAA′ and
UBB′ on Alice’s and Bob’s side that transform |ψ〉 into
∑
k
√
λk|ψk〉AB ⊗ |k, k〉A′B′ for a set of
orthogonal states {|k〉}k and |ψk〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) for each k.
If Alice measures register A′ or Bob measures B′ in the basis {|k〉}k, she/he transforms the
state defined above into the state |ψk〉AB ⊗ |k, k〉A′B′ with probability λk. Measuring register
A′ arbitrarily does on average not increase S(AA′;Y ), and analogously, measuring B′ does not
increase S(X ;BB′) on average. Hence, it follows from Holevo bound (Theorem 2.1) that
S(AA′;Y ) = S(A;Y ) + S(A′;Y |A) ≥ S(A;Y ) + S(K;Y |A) = S(AK;Y ) ,
where K denotes the random variable associated with the measurement of register A′ in the
computational basis. Therefore, the leakage of |ψ〉 is at least the average leakage of one particular
strategy, i.e. ∆ψ ≥
∑
k λk∆ψk . Hence, there must exist a k such that for |ψ∗〉 := |ψk〉, it holds
that ∆ψ ≥ ∆ψ∗ . ⊓⊔
C.3 Proof of Theorem 4.5
In fact, the random variables X ց Y and Y ց X in the claim can be replaced by any variables
X ′ and Y ′, satisfying that X ↔ X ′ ↔ Y and X ↔ Y ′ ↔ Y are Markov chains, and that
Y ′ = fY (Y ) and X ′ = fX(X) for some deterministic functions fY and fX . For such random
variables we then have I(X ′;Y ′) = I(X ;Y ). Therefore, showing that for |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) with the
lowest leakage among all embeddings of PX,Y (its regularity follows from Lemma 4.3) and for some
|ψ∗〉 ∈ E(PX′,Y ′) , it holds that
Sψ(B)− I(X ;Y ) = ∆ψ(PX,Y ) ≥ ∆ψ∗(PX′,Y ′) = Sψ∗(B)− I(X ′;Y ′)
is equivalent to proving Sψ(B) ≥ Sψ∗(B). First, we show that there exists |ψ˜〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ′) such
that Sψ(B) ≥ Sψ˜(B), i.e. ∆ψ(PX,Y ) ≥ ∆ψ˜(PX,Y ′). The existence of |ψ∗〉 such that ∆ψ˜(PX,Y ′) ≥
∆ψ∗(PX′,Y ′) follows from an analogous argument.
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State |ψ〉 can be written in the form:
|ψ〉 =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)e
iθ(x,y)|x, y〉 .
For any realization y′ of Y ′, let Oy′ := {y : fY (y) = y′}. WLOG assume that Oy′ = {1, . . . , ky′}.
Let g be a bijection of the form g(y) = (fY (y), jy), where jy ∈ {1, . . . , kfY (y)}. A pair (y′, j)
determines its g-preimage uniquely and therefore, in the following we sometimes encode y by
fY (y)jy = (y
′, j). Formally, there is a unitary transform U of Bob such that
IA ⊗ U |ψ〉|0〉B =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)e
iθ(x,y)|x, fY (y)jy〉
=
∑
x,y′
√
PX,Y ′(x, y′)|x, y′〉
ky′∑
j=1
√
PY |Y ′=y′(g−1(y′, j))eiθ(x,g
−1(y′,j))|j〉 . (2)
Our goal for the rest of the proof is to transform the register containing j into a form where
the order of the summations over (x, y′) and j in (2) can be reversed to get a state of the form
1√
t
t∑
j=1
∣∣∣ψˆj〉
AB
|j〉B,
where t is some normalization factor and each |ψˆj〉 is in E(PX,Y ′). Our claim that there exists
a state |ψ˜〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ′) such that Sψ˜(B) ≤ Sψ(B) then follows from concavity of Von Neumann
entropy i.e., from the fact that the average of the entropies of the states {trA |ψˆj〉〈ψˆj |}j is smaller
than the entropy of their mixture which is equivalent to trA |ψ〉〈ψ|.
In order to reverse the order of summation in (2), we show that there exists a unitary W on
Bob’s system such that
(IA ⊗W )(IA ⊗ U |ψ〉|0〉B)|0〉B = |ϕ〉 =
1√
t
t∑
z=1
∣∣∣ψˆz〉
AB
|z〉B ,
where each |ψˆz〉 is a quantum embedding of a joint random variable XˆYˆ , with the distribution
arbitrarily close to distribution PX,Y ′ .
Equality (2) suggests to construct the states |ψˆz〉AB by disentangling the register containing j
from the registers containing (x, y′). This method will indeed lead us to the result but only after
some pre-processing of the register containing j. First, we show how to split the register with j
for each value of y′ into a uniform superposition of t values which Bob can measure afterwards
to determine the index z of an embedding |ψˆz〉. The uniformity over the register containing the
indices ensures that measuring the index does not have any impact on the probability distribution
PX,Y ′ implemented by |ψˆz〉.
Consider t ∈ N such that 0 < 1/t ≪ miny{PY |Y ′=fY (y)(y)}. We can ensure that each y′ ∈
Y ′ is split into exactly t index-values z, by adaptively defining a function [tPY |fY (Y )=y′(y)]y ∈
{⌈ ⌉, ⌊ ⌋}, indicating into how many values z a given y such that fY (y) = y′ splits. This procedure
is elementary, but somewhat technical, and we postpone the detailed description to the end of the
proof.
For an event y′ of Y ′, define t0 := 0 and for i ∈ {1, . . . , ky′},
ti :=
∑
j≤i
[tPY |fY (Y )=y′(y
′, j)]y′,j .
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Let Bob’s unitary transform W acting upon the registers containing Y ′, j ∈ {1, . . . , kY ′} and
ancillas set to 0, be defined as follows:
W |y′, j〉|0〉 = |y′〉 1√
[PY |fY (Y )=y′(y′, j)t]y′,j
tj∑
z=tj−1+1
|z〉 .
The definition of [ ]y implies that for each y
′: tky′ = t, thus z ∈ {1, . . . , t}. We can write
|ϕ〉 := (IA ⊗W )((IA ⊗ U)|ψ〉AB|0〉B)|0〉B
=
∑
x,y′
√
PX,Y ′(x, y′)|x, y′〉
ky′∑
j=1
√
PY |fY (Y )=y′(y′, j)
[PY |fY (Y )=y′(y′, j)t]y′,j
eiθ(x,(y
′,j))
tj∑
z=tj−1+1
|z〉. (3)
For the term
PY |fY (Y )=y′
(y′)
[PY |fY (Y )=y′ (y)t]y
from (3) we have
∣∣∣∣ PY |fY (Y )=y′(y)[PY |fY (Y )=y′(y)t]y −
1
t
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ tPY |fY (Y )=y′(y)− [PY |fY (Y )=y′(y)t]yt[PY |fY (Y )=y′(y)t]y
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
PY |fY (Y )=y′(y)t2 − t
=
1
PY |fY (Y )=y′(y)t2
+O
(
1
t3
)
. (4)
Now we can finally swap the summations to isolate z as promised earlier. From (3) and (4) follows
that
|ϕ〉 =
∑
x,y′
√
PX,Y ′(x, y′)|x, y′〉
t∑
z=1
eiθ
′(x,y′,z)
√
1
t
+
ε(y′, z)
t2
|z〉
=
1√
t
t∑
z=1

∑
x,y′
eiθ
′(x,y′,z)
√
1 +
ε(y′, z)
t
√
PX,Y ′(x, y′)|x, y′〉

 |z〉,
where |ε(y′, z)| ≤ 1miny {PY |Y ′=fY (y)(y)} and since a pair (y
′, z) uniquely determines y that it came
from, θ′(x, y′, z) = θ(x, y) for y corresponding to (y′, z). If Bob measures z, the state |ϕ〉 collapses
to 
∑
x,y′
eiθ
′(x,y′,z)
√
1 +
ε(y′, z)
t
√
PX,Y ′(x, y′)|x, y′〉

⊗ |z〉 = ∣∣∣ψˆz〉⊗ |z〉 .
The state |ψˆz〉 lies in E(PXˆ,Yˆ ) for a joint probability distribution PXˆ,Yˆ which is arbitrarily close
to PX,Y ′ . The distance of the two distributions depends on the choice of t.
Hence, for any δ > 0 there is a way to pick a unitary transform Wδ (with t large enough) such
that after applying Wδ and measuring z, the corresponding quantum systems satisfy |Sψ˜z(B) −
Sψˆz(B)| ≤ δ for some |ψ˜z〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ′).
Concavity of Von Neumann entropy together with the fact that the state 1√
t
∑t
z=1 |ψˆz〉|z〉 is
locally equivalent to |ψ〉 imply that
1
t
t∑
z=1
Sψˆz(B) ≤ Sψ(B) .
Therefore, Sψ(B) ≥ minz{Sψˆz(B)}, and Sψ(B) ≥ minz{Sψ˜z(B)} − δ for δ arbitrarily small.
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Continuity of Von Neumann entropy yields Sψ(B) ≥ Sψ˜(B) for some |ψ˜〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ′), which is
what we wanted to show.
Finally, it remains to give the correct definition of [ ]y: For any y
′, let us start by setting
[tPY |fY (Y )=y′(y)]y : = ⌊tPY |fY (Y )=y′(y)⌋ for all y : fY (y) = y′. We now increase the value of
[tPY |fY (Y )=y′(y)]y in steps and show that at some point, this value equals t. Let 0 ≤ i ≤ ky′ .
In the i-th step, replace [ ]y′,i = ⌊ ⌋ with [ ]y′,i = ⌈ ⌉. After ky′ steps, [ ]y = ⌈ ⌉ for all y :
fY (y) = y
′. In every step the sum
∑
y,fY (y)=y′
[tPY |fY (Y )=y′(y)]y increases by at most 1. Clearly,
since
∑
y PY |fY (Y )=y′(y) = 1, we get that∑
y,fY (y)=y′
⌊tPY |fY (Y )=y′(y)⌋ ≤ t and
∑
y,fY (y)=y′
⌈tPY |fY (Y )=y′(y)⌉ ≥ t ,
thus for some i,
∑
y,fY (y)=y′
[tPY |fY (Y )=y′(y)]y = t. ⊓⊔
C.4 Proof of Theorem 4.8
State |ψ〉A0A1B0B1 ∈ E(PX′,Y ′) can be written in the form:
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈X ′1
√
PX′1(x)|x〉A1 |ψx〉A0B ,
where each |ψx〉 is a regular embedding of PX′0Y ′0Y ′1 |X′1=x. Since
Sψ(Y
′|A) ≤ Sψ(Y ′|A0, X ′1) =
∑
x
PX′1(x)Sψx(Y
′|A0, X ′1 = x) ,
we obtain for the leakage of |ψ〉 that
∆ψ(PX′,Y ′) = H(Y
′|X ′)− Sψ(Y ′|A)
≥ H(Y ′|X ′)−
∑
x
PX′1 (x)Sψx(Y
′|A0, X ′1 = x)
=
∑
x
PX′1(x)(H(Y
′|X ′0, X ′1 = x) − Sψx(Y ′|A0, X ′1 = x))
=
∑
x
PX′1(x)∆ψx (PX′0,Y ′0Y ′1 |X′1=x) .
By applying the same argument to each |ψx〉, we obtain that
∆ψ(PX′,Y ′) ≥
∑
xy
PX′1,Y ′1 (x, y)∆ψx,y (PX′0,Y ′0 |X′1=x,Y ′1=y) , (5)
where each |ψx,y〉 is a regular embedding of PX′0,Y ′0 |X′1=x,Y ′1=y. For each (x, y) such that PX′0,Y ′0 |X′1=x,Y ′1=y ≃
PX,Y is satisfied, we get that
∆ψx,y (PX′0,Y ′0 |X′1=x,Y ′1=y) ≥ ∆PX,Y .
Since
∑
x,y:PX′
0
,Y ′
0
|X′
1
=x,Y ′
1
=y≃PX,Y PX′1,Y ′1 (x, y) ≥ 1− δ, we get from (5) that
∆ψ(PX′,Y ′) ≥ (1 − δ)PX,Y .
⊓⊔
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C.5 Proof of Theorem 4.6
Theorem 4.5 implies that if there is a 0–leaking embedding of PX,Y than there is also a 0–leaking
embedding of PXցY,YցX . Let us therefore assume that |ψ〉 is a non-leaking embedding of PX,Y
such that X = X ց Y and Y = Y ց X . We can write |ψ〉 in the form |ψ〉 =∑x√PX(x)|x〉|ϕx〉
and get ρB =
∑
x PX(x)|ϕx〉〈ϕx|. For the leakage of |ψ〉 we have:∆ψ(PX,Y ) = S(ρB)−I(X ;Y ) = 0.
From the Holevo bound (Theorem 2.1) follows that the states {|ϕx〉}x form an orthonormal basis
of their span (since X = X ց Y , they are all different) and that Y captures the result of a
measurement in this basis, which therefore is the computational basis. Since Y = Y ց X , we get
that for each x, there is a single yx ∈ Y such that |ϕx〉 = |yx〉. The primitives PXցY,YցX and
PX,Y are therefore trivial. ⊓⊔
C.6 Tripartite Embeddings and Proof of Theorem 4.7
It is natural to generalize the scenario involving only two parties to the setting where the two players
also have access to a particular trusted third party who provides them with classical variables
X ′, Y ′ sampled according to distribution PX′,Y ′ . The state produced by purifying Alice’s and
Bob’s actions in such a protocol up to the final measurement yielding X and Y can without loss of
generality be viewed as a pure state shared among Alice, Bob and an environment |ψ〉EABA′B′ =∑
e
√
PE(e)|e〉E ⊗ |ψe〉ABA′B′ . We define tripartite embeddings of a primitive PX,Y analogously
to the case of embeddings:
Definition C.1. A state |ψ〉 =∑e PE(e)|e〉E ⊗ |ψe〉ABA′B′ is a tripartite embedding of PX,Y , if
measuring registers A and B in the computational basis yields X,Y with distribution PX,Y and the
ensemble ρABA′B′ := trE |ψ〉〈ψ| satisfies S(X ;Y B′) = S(XA′;Y ) = I(X ;Y ) .
The generalization of the notion of leakage to tripartite embeddings is straightforward:
Definition C.2. Let |ψ〉 ∈ HE⊗HABA′B′ be a tripartite embedding of PX,Y . We define the leakage
of ρABA′B′ := trE |ψ〉〈ψ| viewed as an implementation of PX,Y as
∆ρABA′B′ (PX,Y ) := max {S(X ;BB′)− I(X ;Y ) , S(AA′;Y )− I(X ;Y )} .
The leakage of a tripartite embedding is non-negative, for the same reason as in the bipartite
case however, it is not necessarily symmetric.
Lemma C.3. A non-leaking tripartite embedding |ψ〉EABA′B′ of PX,Y implements PX,Y ideally
(which means: equivalently to the ideal functionality).
Proof. As we can see below, the statement generalizes Theorem 4.6. Here we assume that in
|ψ〉EABA′B′ , Alice’s and Bob’s entire registers are used to compute X and Y i.e., there are no
additional registers. This is without loss of generality because for any Y˜ capturing the result of
measuring only a part of Bob’s register, we get that
S(X ;B) ≥ I(X ;Y ) ≥ I(X ; Y˜ ) .
Hence, |ψ〉 being a non-leaking tripartite embedding of PX,Y˜ implies that |ψ〉 is a non-leaking
tripartite embedding of PX,Y . Clearly, also |ψ〉 implementing PX,Y ideally implies that |ψ〉 imple-
ments PX,Y˜ ideally. Therefore, showing that if |ψ〉 is a non-leaking tripartite embedding of PX,Y˜
then it implements PX,Y˜ ideally is equivalent to showing that if |ψ〉 is a non-leaking tripartite
embedding of PX,Y then it implements PX,Y ideally, for Y capturing the result of measuring the
entire register of Bob. An analogous argument holds on Alice’s side. Therefore, the respective ad-
ditional registers A′ and B′ of Alice and Bob can be taken trivial. Because |ψ〉EAB is 0–leaking,
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we have that S(X ;B) = I(X ;Y ), which by the Holevo bound (Theorem 2.1) implies that we can
write
trEA |ψ〉〈ψ| =
∑
x
PX(x) trE |ϕx〉〈ϕx| ,
where all trE |ϕx〉〈ϕx| are simultaneously diagonalizable. If the common diagonal basis of these
states is {|z〉}z, then the cq-state shared between Alice, holding her classical output, and Bob is
ρXB =
∑
z′
(∑
x
(
PX|fZ(z)=z′(x)|x〉〈x|
))
σz
′
,
where fZ(Z) := Z ց X and
σz
′
:=
∑
z:fZ (z)=z′
az|z〉〈z| .
This is a purely classical state, implementing the distribution PX,Z securely on Bob’s side. Any
information that Bob can learn about the distribution of X is via the distribution of Z ց X that
he learns by measuring his part. Hence, for the honest measurement of Bob captured by Y , we
have that X ↔ Z ց X ↔ Y ց X is a Markov chain. From the assumption S(X ;B) = I(X ;Y )
we get:
S(X ;B) = I(X ;Z) = I(X ;Z ց X) = I(X ;Y ) = I(X ;Y ց X) ,
yielding S(X |Y ց X) = S(X |Z ց X). Due to the Markov chain property,
S(X |Z ց X,Y ց X) = S(X |Z ց X) ,
implying that
S(X |Y ց X,Z ց X) = S(X |Y ց X) ,
i.e. X ↔ Y ց X ↔ Z ց X is also a Markov chain. Since both Z ց X and Y ց X are
minimum random variables (see Section 2 for the meaning of “minimum”) WZ , WY such that
X ↔ WZ ↔ Z ց X and X ↔ WY ↔ Y ց X are Markov chains, we get that Z ց X = Y ց X .
Then ρXB can be written as:
ρXB =
∑
y′
∑
x
(
PX|fY (y)=y′(x)|x〉〈x|
)
ρy
′
,
where the support of each of ρy
′
only contains y-values such that fY (y) = y
′. It follows that then,
ρXB privately implements PX,YցX on Bob’s side. Analogously, S(A;Y ) = I(X ;Y ) implies that
ρAY privately implements PYցX,Y on Alice’s side. In such a case, trEA |ψ〉〈ψ| = trEA |ψ′〉〈ψ′| and
trEB |ψ〉〈ψ| = trEB |ψ′〉〈ψ′| for |ψ′〉EAB satisfying
|ψ′〉EAB =
∑
x′,y′
√
PXցY,YցX(x′, y′)|x′, y′〉E
∣∣∣ωx′,y′〉
AB
where ∣∣∣ωx′,y′〉
AB
=
∑
x,y:fX(x)=x′,fY (y)=y′
αx,y|x, y〉 .
For S(X ;B) we then get that
S(X ;B) = I(X ց Y ;Y ց X) +
∑
x′,y′
PXցY,YցX(x′, y′)S(trA
∣∣∣ωx′,y′〉〈ωx′,y′∣∣∣)
= I(X ;Y ) +
∑
x′,y′
PXցY,YցX(x′, y′)S(trA
∣∣∣ωx′,y′〉〈ωx′,y′∣∣∣).
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Hence, equality S(X ;B) = I(X ;Y ) can hold only if all |ωx′,y′〉 are product states, implying
that from each party’s point of view, a non-leaking tripartite embedding has to be equivalent to
∑
x′,y′
√
PXցY,YցX(x′, y′)|x′, y′〉E
∑
x
√
PX|XցY=x′(x)|x〉A
∑
y
√
PY |YցX=y′(y)|y〉B. (6)
Clearly, such a tripartite embedding implements PX,Y ideally. Furthermore, in such a case for
|ψ〉EAB =
∑
e |e〉E |ψe〉AB, each |ψe〉 has to be an embedding of a trivial primitive. Since the
knowledge of e then enables Bob to learn the value of X ց Y completely, S(E|B) ≥ H(X ց
Y |Y ) needs to hold. Analogously we can show that S(E|A) ≥ H(Y ց X |X). Notice that in the
case of a bipartite embedding, this can only happen if the computational basis is the Schmidt
basis for both Alice and Bob. It follows that the distribution of PXցY,YցX is then of the form:
PXցY,YցX(x′, y′x′) = PXցY (x
′), where for x′0 6= x′1, y′x′0 6= y
′
x′1
. Primitive PX,Y is then trivial and
the claim of Theorem 4.6 follows. ⊓⊔
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4.7). Consider a quantum protocol equipped with a black box for PX,Y .
Due to (6), from the players’ perspectives, such a protocol is indistinguishable from a protocol
where S(E|A) ≤ H(Y ց X |X) and S(E|B) ≤ H(X ց Y |Y ) during the entire protocol execution,
with the following black-box implementation of PX,Y :
|ψ〉EAB =
∑
x′,y′
√
PXցY,YցX(x′, y′)|x′, y′〉E |x′, y′〉AB. (7)
The bits that each player receives from a black box for PX,Y are only classically correlated with
the environment and with the outcome of the other player. It follows that at any moment of
the protocol’s execution, honest-but-curious players can measure their parts of the black box
output, store their respective classical outcomes, and proceed further without being detected.
Such a measurement on Alice’s side extracts incomplete information about the environment which
therefore partially collapses. If the measurement takes place at the beginning of the computation,
where it is not preceded by any non-invertible operation such as another measurement, then Alice’s
uncertainty about the environment at this point is H(Y ց X |X). Since the environment remains
unaffected during the protocol’s run, S(E|A) cannot exceed this value at any time later.
WLOG now assume that H(Y ′ ց X ′|X ′) > H(Y ց X |X). There is a tripartite embedding of
PX,Y of the form (7), where S(E|A) = H(Y ց X |X). We have argued that the protocol for PX′,Y ′
built upon such a black box is indistinguishable from the same protocol using a different black
box for PX,Y and furthermore, S(E|A) ≤ H(Y ց X |X) during the entire run of the protocol.
However, in the proof of Lemma C.3 we have shown that in any non-leaking tripartite embedding
of PX′,Y ′ , S(E|A) ≥ H(Y ′ ց X ′|X ′) must hold. Since H(Y ′ ց X ′|X ′) > H(Y ց X |X), the
protocol must leak information. ⊓⊔
D Leakage of Universal Primitives
D.1 Exact calculations
First, we look at the leakage of the embeddings of Rabin String OT (rotr).
Theorem D.1. Any embedding of P rot
r
X,Y is at least (1−O(r2−r))-leaking. For r = 1 any embedding
is at least (h(14 ) − 12 ) ≈ 0.311-leaking. Furthermore, the leakage is the same for all embeddings of
P rot
r
X,Y .
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Proof. Let
|ψ〉 = 1
2
r+1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}r
eiθ(x,x)|xx〉 + 1
2
r+1
2

 ∑
x∈{0,1}r
eiθ(x,⊥)|x〉

 |⊥〉 ,
where ⊥ denotes an erasure, be a general form of an embedding of P rotrX,Y .
Define |ϕ〉 := 1
2r/2
∑
x∈{0,1}r e
iθ(x,⊥)|x〉. If Bob guesses the value of Alice’s string successfully,
Alice gets an ensemble ρ0 = 12r
∑
x∈{0,1}r |x〉〈x|. If an erasure occurs on Bob’s side, Alice gets
ρ1 = |ϕ〉〈ϕ|. We find S(A) by computing the eigenvalues of ρA := 12 (ρ0 + ρ1).
Since ρ0 = 12r IA, |v〉 is an eigenvector of ρA if and only if it is an eigenvector of ρ1. If |v〉 is an
eigenvector of ρ1 then either a) |v〉 = eiθ|ϕ〉 or b) 〈v|ϕ〉 = 0. If a) is true then
ρA|v〉 = 1
2
(ρ0|v〉+ ρ1|v〉) = 1
2
(
1 +
1
2r
)
|v〉 ,
whereas in the case b),
ρA|v〉 = 1
2
(ρ0|v〉+ ρ1|v〉) = 1
2r+1
.
The state ρA has eigenvalues { 12 + 12r+1 , 12r+1 }, where 12r+1 has multiplicity 2r − 1. S(A) can then
be computed as follows:
S(A) = −
(
1
2
+
1
2r+1
)
log
(
1
2
+
1
2r+1
)
+
2r − 1
2r+1
(r + 1)
=
(
1
2
+
1
2r+1
)(
1− 1
ln 2 · 2r + o
(
1
2r
))
+
r + 1
2
− r + 1
2r+1
=
r
2
+ 1−O
( r
2r
)
.
Since I(X ;Y ) = r2 , for the leakage we get:
∆ψ(P
rotr
X,Y ) = S(A)− I(X ;Y ) = 1− O
( r
2r
)
.
As we can see, the leakage does not depend on the phase-function θ. ⊓⊔
In the following theorem we minimize the leakage of an embedding of P otX,Y .
Theorem D.2. Any |ψ〉 ∈ E(P otX,Y ) is at least 12 -leaking. The leakage is minimized by the canonical
embedding.
Proof. Let
|ψ〉 = 1
2
√
2
∑
x0,x1,c∈{0,1}
eiθ(x0x1,cxc)|x0x1〉|cxc〉
be a regular embedding of P otX,Y . Without loss of generality assume that θ(00, 00) = 0. Notice that
for the local phase-change transforms
UA := |00〉〈00|+ exp(iθ(01, 00))|01〉〈01|+ exp(i(θ(10, 10)− θ(00, 10)))|10〉〈10|
+ exp(i(θ(10, 10) + θ(11, 01)− θ(00, 10)− θ(10, 01)))|11〉〈11|,
UB := |00〉〈00|+ exp(i(θ(00, 10) + θ(10, 01)− θ(10, 10)))|01〉〈01|
+ exp(iθ(00, 10))|10〉〈10|+ exp(i(θ(01, 11)− θ(01, 00)))|11〉〈11|,
we get
UA ⊗ UB|ψ〉 = |ψ′〉 = 1
2
(|0+〉|00〉+ |1+〉|01〉+ |+0〉|10〉+ |0〉+ e
iω|1〉√
2
|1〉|11〉) ,
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where ω = θ(00, 10) + θ(01, 00) + θ(10, 01) + θ(11, 11)− θ(01, 01)− θ(10, 10)− θ(11, 01).
Let A′ denote Alice’s quantum system for Alice and Bob sharing |ψ′〉. Since S(A) = S(A′), we
can minimize S(A′) in order to minimize S(A). Assume that Alice and Bob share |ψ′〉. For Bob’s
selection bit c = 0, Alice gets an ensemble ρ0 =
1
2 (|0+〉〈0+| + |1+〉〈1+|), whereas for c = 1, she
gets ρ1 =
1
2 (|+0〉〈+0|+ (|01〉+ eiω|11〉)(〈01|+ e−iω〈11|)), where ρA′ = 12 (ρ0 + ρ1). By solving the
characteristic equation of ρA′ we get the set of eigenvalues { 14 (1± cos ω4 ), 14 (1± sin ω4 )}. S(A′) can
then be expressed as follows:
S(A′) = 1 +
h(1−cos(ω/4)2 ) + h(
1−sin(ω/4)
2 )
2
.
By computing the second derivative of f(x) = h(1−
√
x
2 ), we get that f
′′(x) ≤ 0 in [0, 1], implying
that f is concave in [0, 1]. For α ∈ [0, 1], Jensen’s inequality yields f(0)+f(1)2 ≤ f(α), and therefore,
f(0)+f(1)
2 ≤ f(α)+f(1−α)2 . Consequently, the minimum of h(1−cos(ω/4)2 )+h(1−sin(ω/4)2 ) = f(cos2 ω4 )+
f(sin2 ω4 ) is achieved for ω = 0 and in this case, S(A
′) = 32 .
Finally, we can conclude that the leakage is minimal for the canonical embedding and∆ψ(PX,Y ) =
S(A)− I(X ;Y ) = S(A′)− I(X ;Y ) ≥ 32 − 1 = 12 . ⊓⊔
There is also a more direct way to interpret this quantity in the case of the canonical embedding
|ψ0〉 for P otX,Y : If Alice and Bob share a single copy of |ψ0〉 then there exist POVMs for both of
them which reveal Bob’s selection bit to Alice, and the XOR of Alice’s bits to Bob, both with
probability 12 . Let |Φ±〉 = 1√2 (|00〉 ± |11〉), |Ψ±〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉) denote the Bell states, and
|±〉 := 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). Observe that the canonical embedding |ψ0〉 of P otX,Y can be expressed as
follows:
|ψ0〉 = 1
2
∣∣Ψ−〉⊗ |Ψ−〉 − |Φ−〉√
2
+
1
2
∣∣Φ−〉⊗ |Ψ+〉 − |Φ+〉√
2
+
1√
2
|++〉|++〉.
In order to get the value x0⊕x1 of Alice’s bits x0 and x1, Bob can use POVM B = {B0,B1,B?} where
B0 :=
1
2 (|Ψ−〉− |Φ−〉)(〈Ψ−|− 〈Φ−|), B1 := 12 (|Ψ+〉− |Φ+〉)(〈Ψ+| − 〈Φ+|), and B? := |++〉〈++|. It is
easy to verify that Bob gets outcome Bz for z ∈ {0, 1} (in which case x0 ⊕ x1 = z with certainty)
with probability 12 . Alice’s POVM can be defined as A = {A0,A1,A?} where A0 := |−+〉〈−+|,
A1 := |+−〉〈+−|, and A? := I2−A0−A1. By inspection we easily find that the probability for Alice
to get Bob’s selection bit is 1 − tr((A? ⊗ I2)|ψ0〉〈ψ0|) = 12 . For any regular embedding of P otX,Y we
can construct similar POVMs revealing the XOR of Alice’s bits to Bob and Bob’s selection bit to
Alice with probability strictly more than 14 .
D.2 Lower Bounds
Theorem D.3. Any embedding |ψ〉 of P otrX,Y is (1 −O(r2−r))-leaking.
Proof. We use Theorem 4.8 to show that any (regular) embedding of P ot
r
X,Y leaks at least as much as
some regular embedding of P rot
r
X,Y . Let (A0, A1) and B denote Alice’s and Bob’s respective registers.
Then |ψ〉A0A1B ∈ E(P ot
r
X,Y ) can be written in the form:
|ψ〉 = 1
2r/2
∑
x∈{0,1}r
|x〉A1 |ψx〉A0B ,
where each
|ψx〉 = 1
2(r+1)/2
∑
x′∈{0,1}r
(
eiθ(x
′,x,0)|x′〉A0 |0, x′〉B + eiθ(x′,x,1)|x′〉A0 |1, x〉
B
)
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can be viewed as a regular embedding of P rot
r
X,Y . According to Theorem 4.8 and Theorem D.1, we
get that
∆P otrX,Y
≥ ∆P rotrX,Y = 1−O(r/2
r) .
⊓⊔
Theorem D.4. If p < 12 − 12√2 then ∆P otpX,Y ≥
“
1/2−p−
√
p(1−p)
”2
8 ln 2 .
Proof. Before starting with the actual proof, we formulate a useful statement, relating two measures
of uncertainty of a quantum ensemble.
Theorem D.5 (Average Encoding Theorem [KNTsZ01]). Let B denote a quantum system
storing the quantum part of a cq-state ρXE =
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE. Then∑
x
PX(x)‖ρE − ρxE‖1 ≤
√
2(ln 2)S(X ;B) .
Let us start with the proof of Theorem D.4. First, we show that for any regular embedding of
PX,Y0Y1 such that Y0 and Y1 are independent,
S(A;Y0Y1) ≤ S(A;Y0) + S(A;Y1) .
We can write
S(A;Y0) + S(A;Y1) = H(Y0) +H(Y1)− S(Y0|A)− S(Y1|A)
= H(Y0Y1)− S(Y0|A)− S(Y1|A)
≤ H(Y0Y1)− S(Y0Y1|A) = S(A;Y0Y1). (8)
Let X,Y0, Y1 be random variables corresponding to Alice’s pair of bits, Bob’s selection bit,
and its value, respectively. For P
otp
X,Y we have that I(X ;Y0Y1) = 1− h(p). S(A;Y0Y1) can then be
lower-bounded by
S(A;Y0Y1) ≥ S(A;Y0) + S(A;Y1) ≥ S(A;Y0) + (1 − h(p)) .
Hence, for computing the lower bound on S(A;Y0Y1), we only need to compute the lower bound
on S(A;Y0). A state |ψ〉 ∈ E(P otpX,Y ) can be written as
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ0〉AB1 |0〉B0 + |ψ1〉AB1 |1〉B0) .
Let ρ0A := trB1 |ψ0〉〈ψ0| and ρ1A := trB1 |ψ1〉〈ψ1|.
By applying Theorem D.5 from above, we get that
‖ρ0A − ρ1A‖1 ≤
√
8(ln 2)S(A;Y0) ,
and therefore,
‖ρ0A − ρ1A‖21
8 ln 2
≤ S(A;Y0). (9)
The trace norm of ρ0A − ρ1A yields an upper bound on the entries of the matrix:
|(ρ0A − ρ1A)ij | ≤ ‖ρ0A − ρ1A‖1. (10)
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We can write the state |ψ〉 in the form:
|ψ〉 = 1
2
∑
y0,y1
|ϕy0,y1〉A|y0, y1〉B0B1 ,
where
|ϕ0,y〉 =
√
1− p
2
1∑
x=0
eiθ(y,x,0,y)|y, x〉A|0, y〉B0B1 +
√
p
2
1∑
x=0
eiθ(y,x,0,1−y)|y, x〉A|0, 1− y〉B0B1
|ϕ1,y〉 =
√
1− p
2
1∑
x=0
eiθ(x,y,1,y)|x, y〉A|1, y〉B0B1 +
√
p
2
1∑
x=0
eiθ(x,y,1,1−y)|x, y〉A|1, 1− y〉B0B1 .
By evaluating the entries of (ρ0A − ρ1A) we get a simple lower bound on |(ρ0A − ρ1A)ij | for i 6= j ∈
{0, . . . , 3}:
|(ρ0A − ρ1A)ij | ≥
1− 2p
4
−
√
(1 − p)p
2
(11)
hence, from (10) follows that
‖ρ0A − ρ1A‖1 ≥
1− 2p
4
−
√
(1− p)p
2
,
yielding due to (8) and (9) that
S(A;Y0Y1) ≥ 1− h(p) + S(A;Y0) ≥ 1− h(p) + (1/2− p−
√
(1 − p)p)2
32 ln 2
.
The lower-bound is non-trivial if 1/2− p−
√
(1 − p)p > 0, which is true for p < 12 − 12√2 . The
results yields the following lower-bound on the leakage of P
otp
X,Y :
∆P otpX,Y
≥ (1/2− p−
√
(1 − p)p)2
32 ln 2
.
However, this lower-bound is very loose, since for p = 0 we get that
∆P otX,Y ≥
1
128 ln2
≈ 0.011 ,
which is much weaker than the optimal
∆P otX,Y ≥
1
2
.
It remains to mention that by using more careful analysis of the phases of |ϕ0.y〉 and |ϕ1,y〉,
the lower bound on the absolute value of the outside-diagonal entries from (11) can be improved,
yielding a non-trivial lower bound on the leakage for p > 0.15 and eventually, even for any p < 1/4.
It is possible that for the values of p close to 1/4, we can get a lower bound with a better ratio
compared to the real value of the minimum leakage of an embedding of P
otp
X,Y . ⊓⊔
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